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Abstract
Functional MRI shows promise as a candidate
prognostication method in acutely comatose patients
following severe brain injury. However, further research
is needed before this technique becomes appropriate for
clinical practice. Drawing on a clinical case, we investigate
the process of obtaining informed consent for this kind of
research and identify four ethical issues. After describing
each issue, we propose potential solutions which would
make a patient’s participation in research compatible
with her rights and interests. First, we defend the need
for traditional proxy consent against two alternative
approaches. Second, we examine the impact of the intensive
care unit environment on the informed consent process.
Third, we discuss the therapeutic misconception and its
potential influence on informed consent. Finally, we deal
with issues of timing in recruiting participants and related
factors which may affect the risks of participation.

Case

Kathy (this is a representative composite case
that does not reflect any single patient) was a
67-year-old woman who suffered an out-of-hospital
cardiac arrest. She received 5 min of cardiopulmonary resuscitation and defibrillation by emergency
medical services at the scene before the return of
spontaneous circulation. In the hospital, she was
diagnosed with an ST-elevation myocardial infarction and underwent thrombolysis, followed by
24 hours of induced therapeutic hypothermia, a
treatment intended to reduce the risk of brain injury
after cardiac arrest. Unfortunately, Kathy sustained
severe anoxic brain injury and remained comatose
after restoration of normal body temperature.
Additional tests were done to help determine her
neurological prognosis. These tests showed mixed
results. On the one hand, an MRI scan showed no
structural abnormality, and somatosensory evoked
potentials were bilaterally present with normal
latency and amplitude. While the bilateral absence
of the N20 somatosensory evoked potentials response
indicates a poor prognosis,1 its presence does not
predict neurological outcome. On the other hand,
Kathy displayed persistent seizure activity on her
electroencephalogram, which is associated with
increased mortality following cardiac arrest.2 3
The neurocritical care team met with Kathy’s
husband and son and explained that they were
uncertain about her likely outcome and needed more

time and information to develop a clearer picture
of Kathy’s prognosis. The care team was aware of
an ongoing research study at the hospital involving
functional MRI for which Kathy was eligible. The
study involved recording brain responses to stimuli
and comparing patient responses with eventual
outcome to determine if functional MRI could be a
useful prognostic test for future patients. Functional
MRI shows promise as a candidate prognostication
method in patients with acute brain injury.4–6
There are ethical issues associated with enrolling
patients like Kathy in functional MRI studies in the
intensive care unit. In particular, given that Kathy
herself cannot provide informed consent, how
should patient autonomy be protected and consent
be obtained? Are there potential obstacles to proxy
decision making in this context? Our ethical analysis stems from reflection on a research study that is
currently under way at the Lawson Health Research
Institute. Written informed consent was obtained
from proxy decision makers in all cases. In this
article, we identify four ethical issues associated
with obtaining informed consent in Kathy’s case.
After describing each issue, we propose potential
solutions which would make Kathy’s participation
in the functional MRI study compatible with her
rights and interests.

Strategies for informed consent in the
intensive care unit
The problem

Informed consent is an important ethical protection
barring involuntary participation in clinical research,
but comatose patients like Kathy are unconscious,
mechanically ventilated and often medically unstable.
Consequently, they cannot provide informed consent
to participate in clinical research. When a patient is
incapable of providing informed consent, a proxy decision maker is appointed to act on the patient’s behalf
and assumes the authority to act as a substitute for the
patient with respect to decision making. In many jurisdictions, the law indicates who is the proxy decision
maker for an incapable patient (e.g., Ontario Health
Care Consent Act, 1996, §20), and proxy decision
makers are typically spouses or other close family
members.
The practice of proxy decision making has
received criticism, particularly in the context of
research in the intensive care unit.7 8 For example,
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Proposed solutions

We argue that the two alternatives put forth by Burns and
colleagues do not sufficiently protect patient autonomy in this
case and are therefore not suitable for functional MRI research
in the intensive care unit. Traditional proxy consent is the only
ethically appropriate strategy in this case. Consider the first
proposed alternative: waiving consent completely. According
to Canadian regulation, a waiver of consent is not acceptable
in studies involving more than minimal risk (Tri-Council Policy
Statement Article 3.7A). Minimal risk is defined as the risks
of daily life and is widely understood to subsume the risks of
a blood draw, routine physician examination and filling out a
questionnaire, all benign procedures. This provision is based, in
our view correctly, on the ethical consideration that it would be
immoral to expose a human being to more than minimal risk
without her consent because doing so would wrongly disregard
the respect that is owed to her autonomy.
In order to evaluate the present case, we must consider that
functional MRI research on acute comatose patients poses
greater than minimal risks in that it requires transport to the
MRI scanner room as well as spending time in the MRI scanner.
Research suggests that intrahospital transport of patients from
the intensive care unit results in a serious adverse event in 4.2%8.9% of cases and cardiac arrest in 0.34%-1.6% of cases.9 Time
spent in the scanner is a risk because the patient is outside the
relative safety of the intensive care unit. If the patient experiences
a medical event (eg, a drop in blood pressure or an increase in
intracranial pressure) outside the intensive care unit, the potential for a negative outcome is increased. If study participation
exposes patients to more than minimal risk, a waiver of consent
is not ethically acceptable. Even if study participation did not
expose patients to more than minimal risk, a waiver of consent
could be granted only if a prior consent requirement made it
impossible or extremely difficult to carry out the study. In the
absence of strong feasibility considerations, there would be no
cogent ethical reason to deprive the patient of the informed
consent protection. Indeed, Tri-Council Policy Statement Article
3.7A grants these waivers, in our view correctly, only if prior
consent makes the study impossible or impracticable. But this
condition is not satisfied for proxy consent in functional MRI
research, as it is practicable to run the study after valid proxy
consent has been obtained. As a result, a waiver of consent
would not be morally acceptable even if the participants were
exposed to risk not exceeding the minimal risk standard.
Consider the second proposed alternative: granting an emergency exception to consent. The purpose of an emergency
exception to consent is to allow research in situations in which a
potential research participant requires urgent medical care and is
unable to consent for herself, and the delay involved in locating
a proxy decision maker could pose a serious risk to the participant’s health. Absent an immediate danger to the prospective
participant or when the research intervention has no therapeutic
effects, an emergency exception does not apply because it would
needlessly remove the informed consent protection to which
participants are normally entitled. Indeed, Tri-Council Policy
300

Statement Article 3.8 rightly specifies that an emergency exception can be granted only if ‘a serious threat to the prospective
participant requires immediate intervention’ and the research
‘addresses the emergency needs of the individuals involved’.10
Although patients like Kathy are in critical condition and are
often medically unstable, functional MRI does not constitute a
response to an urgent medical need and is not an instance of
emergency research. The study does not include any life-saving
interventions, and the delay associated with locating a proxy
decision maker does not pose a health risk to patients. In fact,
functional MRI in the proposed research is a non-therapeutic
research intervention; it does not offer a realistic probability of
direct benefit to the participant.11 The benefits of the study lie
in the production of generalisable knowledge, which may help
future patients, but not Kathy herself. As the conditions for an
emergency exception do not obtain, functional MRI research on
acute comatose patients must rely on traditional proxy consent.

Obstacles to proxy decision making in the intensive
care unit context
The problem

The intensive care unit is a challenging environment for clinical research and creates obstacles to obtaining informed consent
from proxy decision makers. Complicating factors, including
stress12 and misunderstandings about the purpose of the
research,13 can impede the decision-making process for proxy
decision makers and thereby weaken informed consent protections. For example, Iverson and colleagues studied family
members of patients currently in the intensive care unit and
used a focus group to discuss their perspectives on participation
in clinical research.14 The authors found that family members
perceived their experience in the hospital as stressful and overwhelming. Specifically, anxiety and stress were mentioned as
reasons not to enrol patients in proposed research studies. Three
main sources of stress were identified:
1. Observing the patient in a critically ill state.
2. Uncertainty about the patient’s clinical outcome.
3. Contemplating whether the patient’s views were being accurately reflected by the proxy decision maker.

Proposed solutions

Given these potential obstacles to proxy decision making, what
strategies might researchers employ to enable proxy consent
in the intensive care unit and ensure that patient autonomy is
respected? One way to promote proxy consent is to approach a
patient’s family about participation in a research study at a time
when stress is minimal, and they are mentally and emotionally
prepared to consider this option. The insights of the patient’s
nurse as well as her intensive care unit physicians are particularly
useful, as they will have had the most contact with the patient’s
family. Thus, the patient’s immediate healthcare providers are in
a good position to inform judgments about whether and when
families should be approached for research participation. If a
proxy decision maker is not in a condition to discuss participation in research, she should not be contacted by the research
team at that time. In some cases, a social worker may provide
useful additional insights.
In addition to deciding when to approach the patient’s family,
it is also important to consider who will approach them. When
the treating physician is also the researcher, an approach by the
physician may create the impression of conflict of interest and
even undermine trust between the physician and the family.
Worse, families may feel pressured to enrol their family member,
Bruni T, et al. J Med Ethics 2019;45:299–303. doi:10.1136/medethics-2018-104867

J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/medethics-2018-104867 on 25 February 2019. Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on July 3, 2020 by guest. Protected by copyright.

Burns and colleagues argue that traditional proxy consent
impedes the recruitment of participants and thus slows scientific progress. In the interest of expediting patient enrolment
in research, Burns and colleagues suggest two alternatives to
obtaining proxy consent:
1. The consent requirement is waived altogether.
2. An emergency exception to the informed consent requirement is sought.
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The therapeutic misconception
The problem

faith in technology—particularly sophisticated technology like
functional MRI—and expects to benefit from contact with it.
Neuroscientific explanations are common and are viewed as
compelling,18 and functional MRI images are often rated as
particularly credible pieces of evidence.19 This optimism could
prevent Kathy’s family from understanding the limitations of the
technique and bias them towards a ‘therapeutic interpretation’
of the functional MRI study. Second, the media, universities
and research funding agencies have generated hype about functional MRI.20 This hype reinforces the perception of functional
MRI mentioned above and may lead to an overestimation of the
potential impact of such technologies on patient care.21

Proposed solutions

Two strategies are available to address therapeutic misconception. First, researchers should ensure that consent materials clearly and accurately describe functional MRI as either
a therapeutic procedure or a non-therapeutic procedure. This
will depend on the specifics of the study protocol. If there is a
reasonable prospect of clinical benefit to the patient, it should be
described in cautious, evidence-based language.11
Second, research staff should spend more time with family
members discussing study participation. One-on-one conversations are an effective means of improving the understanding
of consent materials and the retention of information by
research participants.22 23 Additionally, there is some evidence
that enhanced consent forms—consent forms that are shorter
and written using simpler language than standard forms—are a
useful means of improving participant understanding.22 23 In fact,
Nishimura and colleagues found that both multimedia interventions and enhanced forms improved information retention over
time.23 Given these results, the use of enhanced consent forms
could also be considered.

The risk of ‘therapeutic misconception’ poses a further obstacle
to the exercise of informed consent rights in functional MRI
research in the intensive care unit.15 Appelbaum and colleagues
define the therapeutic misconception as the belief that ‘every
aspect of the research project to which [the patient] had
consented was designed to benefit him directly’ (p20).15 Under a
therapeutic misconception, patients and proxy decision makers
fail to understand that participation in a research study is
different from routine medical care.
There is some debate regarding the degree to which therapeutic misconception undermines the validity of informed
consent and weakens patient autonomy. It has been argued that
because consent under therapeutic misconception is uninformed,
it is not valid; the person consenting lacks understanding and,
as such, cannot provide valid consent.16 Conversely, others
have argued that a patient or proxy decision maker may retain
sufficient autonomy to give informed consent even when therapeutic misconception leads to incomplete understanding, and
so we should continue to presume autonomy, absent compelling evidence of serious misunderstanding.17 Legitimate ethical
reasons back both of these standpoints: the former prioritises
patient protection, whereas the latter endeavours to strike a
balance between respect for patient autonomy and the beneficial
social effects of clinical research.
In our view, the key issue is not, however, whether therapeutic misconception makes consent invalid, but rather whether
it causes participants to misconstrue the benefits and risks of
research participation. If a patient (mistakenly) thinks that she
stands to benefit directly from what is actually a non-therapeutic
procedure, this may cause her to make a decision that she would
not have made if she had understood the facts correctly. In the
case at hand, Kathy’s family could interpret the non-therapeutic
functional MRI scan as a therapeutic procedure which may
provide a direct benefit to her, or as a diagnostic procedure that
is required by Kathy’s medical condition. Both beliefs would
instantiate the therapeutic misconception and could lead Kathy’s
family to accept a higher level of risk than they might otherwise.
There is no empirical evidence regarding the degree or nature
of therapeutic misconception in studies using functional MRI
on comatose patients, and we believe further study is indicated.
There are indirect lines of evidence that suggest that some family
members will have unreasonable expectations about the effects
of the study on the patient’s clinical care. First, the public has

Consent for functional MRI research must be obtained from
patients in the intensive care unit in a timely manner. The ideal
candidate for these studies is a patient with acute brain injury
that is comatose, unsedated and capable of remaining still in the
MRI scanner. Finding participants that satisfy these conditions
is difficult because the likelihood that a patient will satisfy them
decreases over time. Moreover, MRI scanner time is limited, as
both clinical and research demand are high.
As discussed above, research involving functional MRI
amongst patients with acute brain injury requires intrahospital
transport, and the accompanying risk to patients resulting from
this transport exceeds minimal risk.9 Accordingly, it is preferable
to perform the research functional MRI scan at the same time as
a clinically indicated structural MRI scan.
Pairing a research scan with a clinically indicated scan reduces
the overall risk to the patient. First, it reduces the number of
total transports and thus the total risk to which patients are
exposed. Second, it makes the transport part of a clinically indicated procedure, meaning the transport-related risk is no longer
a research risk, but a clinical risk. As mentioned above, time
spent in the scanner is also a source of risk. In the case of paired
scans, only the duration of the research scan would count as a
research risk; the time spent in the scanner for the purposes of
a clinical scan would be a clinical risk. In these cases, the incremental risk posed to patients in functional MRI research may
drop below the minimal risk standard.
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Timing and differential levels of risk
The problem
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or may believe that the physician merely wants to use her as
a means to achieving a research goal. To avoid these potential
pitfalls, we argue that the idea of research participation ought to
be first discussed with the patient’s healthcare providers. If there
is agreement that the family is in a sufficiently robust emotional
state, the family ought to be approached by a third party, in our
case a highly trained research coordinator. The research coordinator will explain the study to the family and will seek their
proxy consent for participation. In this conversation, the research
coordinator will explain the study’s purpose, procedures, benefits (if any), risks, alternatives, the right to refuse participation
and to whom questions may be addressed. Adequate time should
be set aside for this interaction, so the family does not feel
rushed. Using a research coordinator maintains a clear distinction between the clinical care of the patient and participation
in research, thereby making it easier for the family to protect
patient autonomy in this challenging environment.

Original research
relevant information regarding study participation, including the
study purpose, procedures, benefits, harms and alternatives. The
Research Ethics Board of the Lawson Health Research Institute
currently authorises this practice in intensive care settings in
which the proxy decision maker is not physically present and
study procedures are subject to strict time constraints. The full
letter of information must be presented through an approved
telephone script. Written consent must be obtained within
24 hours of the telephone consent. If the proxy decision maker
agrees to participation by phone but does not sign the informed
consent form within 24 hours, the patient is withdrawn from the
study. Telephone consent poses challenges to researchers: they
must ensure that information is adequately understood and that
respect for patient autonomy is not compromised.

Proposed solutions

Back to the case

MRI scanner time is a scarce resource required by both clinicians
and researchers. Since paired scans reduce the research risk to
which patients are exposed, they ought to be conducted whenever possible. If research staff approached families regarding
research participation without undue delay, ‘paired’ scans would
not result in a slower pace of research or in a suboptimal decision-making process for family members. Time constraints could
be partially eased by increasing the availability of research staff.
Another strategy would be to increase the amount of MRI slots
that are available to researchers relative to clinical scans.
If ‘paired’ scans and independent scans are both conducted
in a given study, it is critical that the difference in risk between
the two kinds of scans be clearly explained to proxy decision makers. The challenge for the research team here is not
to rush the proxy decision maker while conveying the relevant
information. Furthermore, two consent forms (one for the
‘paired’ scan and one for the independent scan) with different
sections on risk are required. If the functional MRI scan is not
paired, the consent document should include a description of the
risks associated with transport to the scanner room. If the structural and functional MRI scans are paired, the research consent
document may omit reference to the risks of transportation. In
this way, proxy decision makers can correctly understand the
research risk the patient would be exposed to.
Finally, telephone consent may be a useful tool in addressing
time constraints. A member of the research team could contact
the proxy decision maker by telephone and verbally convey the
302

Conclusion

Functional MRI research pits respect for patient autonomy
against the social benefits of clinical research. We make recommendations that balance these important goods. As the patient is
unconscious in our research, the proxy decision maker is tasked
with protecting patient autonomy: she must choose—while
taking the patient’s values and interests into account—whether
the patient will be enrolled in the study. First, we argued that
the proxy decision maker cannot be dispensed with, because
both a waiver of consent and an emergency exception would
not be ethically sound in this case. Second, we examined three
potential problems for proxy decision makers: they must make
an important choice in the challenging environment of the intensive care unit, could fall prey to therapeutic misconception, and
face complicated issues of timing. To address these issues, we
proposed solutions that, we contend, allow functional MRI
research on comatose patients without impinging on any morally
significant interests.

The care team brought up the study during one of their meetings with Kathy’s family and explained its rationale and procedures. A researcher was introduced to the family, and after an
in-depth discussion of the study Kathy’s proxy decision maker
gave written informed consent. A clinically indicated structural MRI and a functional MRI were performed in a paired
manner 11 days post-injury. The functional MRI showed that
Kathy had preserved functionality in networks associated with
sound perception, speech perception and language comprehension.25 However, Kathy could not perform mental imagery tasks,
that is, volitional tasks in which the patient imagines carrying out
a motor action such as playing tennis.25 At the time of imaging,
Kathy remained comatose and dependent on a mechanical
ventilator. Neurological examination indicated that she could
withdraw her lower extremities from painful peripheral stimuli
and spontaneously open her eyes, but that she could not fixate,
track, blink or close her eyes on command. Three days after the
functional MRI (day 14), Kathy’s neurological status started to
gradually improve. A month after her injury, her family reported
that her usual personality had returned. Kathy was discharged
40 days after admission fully alert, oriented and asking appropriate questions. At the 6-month follow-up, she had resumed her
normal activities prior to admission.
Contributor TB and CW conceptualized the paper. TB wrote the first draft of the
paper, and MG and CW edited and rewrote sections of the next draft of the paper.
All other team members provided comments on subsequent drafts of the paper. All
authors approved the final paper.
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In spite of the advantages of pairing MRI scans, doing so further
exacerbates time management problems because it requires two
slots in a row (which are not always available), and thus can be
arranged only if tight time constraints are respected. These time
constraints can hinder the family’s decision-making process and
further complicate the obtainment of informed consent in the
intensive care unit setting. For example, the research team could
learn that a clinically indicated scan has been ordered with only
a short time to talk to the patient’s family about the study. In
this case, informed consent might be rushed, and proxy decision makers may not have enough time to fully understand the
information provided. In fact, Barrett and colleagues showed
that proxy decision makers were less comfortable with being
involved in clinical research decisions if the enrolment window
was short,24 while Burns and colleagues showed that expired
time windows were one of the main reasons why opportunities
to recruit patients in the intensive care unit setting were missed.8
The potentially brief amount of time a proxy decision maker
has to deliberate can also impact the level of risk associated
with participation in these studies; proxy decision makers that
consent at different points in time may be consenting to different
levels of risk (all other factors, such as the patient’s haemodynamic stability, being equal). For example, if a proxy decision
maker consents soon enough to make ‘pairing’ possible, the
associated research risk is simply the additional time spent in the
scanner. In this case, transport to and from the scanner is a clinical risk and not a research risk. Conversely, if the proxy decision
maker consents when it is no longer possible to pair the research
scan with a clinical scan, an additional transport to and from
the scanner is required, thereby increasing the research-related
risk of participation. Accordingly, the proxy decision maker has
a rational incentive to make a decision about participation early.
However, this incentive could compel proxy decision makers
to give consent to participation before they have given it due
consideration.
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